Do You Recall?

Memory is a curious thing. People tend to forget those things of which they are not reminded. Now that the US is embroiled in wars on two fronts, examining a timeline of US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq serves to refresh our memory of how we got to where we are. Here is a walk down memory lane.

In December 1997 members of the Taliban paid a visit to Texas to discuss with oil barons the possibility of building a pipeline through Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, VP Dick Cheney, then CEO of Halliburton, said "I can't think of a time when we've had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant.... It's almost as if the opportunities have arisen overnight." Coincidentally, Mr. Cheney was equally as interested in Iraq as Afghanistan, but for a different reason. The month after negotiating with the Taliban, in January 1998 Mr. Cheney signed his name to a document sponsored by The People for a New American Century. It read in part, "Saddam Hussein must go... [I]f the United States is committed... to insuring that the Iraqi leader never again uses weapons of mass destruction, the only way to achieve that goal is to remove Mr. Hussein and his regime from power. Any policy short of that will fail." The Taliban was worthy of being a business partner, but Saddam had to go.

This attitude carried over into the Bush administration in 2001. One of the first things President Bush did was fill his administration with members from that very same People for a New American Century who disliked Saddam but tolerated the Taliban. Those names include: Elliott Abrams, Dick Cheney, Frank Gaffney, Zalmay Khalilzad, Lewis Libby, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz. By February 2001, the newly inaugurated President Bush himself started saber-rattling against Saddam. "Our intention is to make sure that the world is as peaceful as possible and we're going to watch very carefully as to whether he (Saddam) develops weapons of mass destruction," Bush said. "If we catch him doing so, we're going to take appropriate action."

While all this attention was being focused on Saddam in early 2001, there was a man, an ally of the United States, who was trying with all his might to get the attention of Washington. His name was Ahmed Shah Massoud. On April 6, 2001, Massoud, the Defense Minister of the deposed but legitimate Afghan government and the man who lead the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda, addressed the European Union. He was asked if he had a message for President Bush. He replied, "My message to President Bush is the following: If he isn't interested in peace in Afghanistan, if he doesn't help the Afghan people to arrive at their objective of peace, the Americans and the rest of the world will have to face the problems.... If President Bush doesn't help us, these terrorists will damage the US and Europe very soon.."

Rather than heed Massoud's advice, the current administration decided a month later to give the Taliban a gift of $43 million. The gift, announced by then Secretary of State Colin Powell, in addition to other recent aid, made the U.S. the main sponsor of the Taliban and rewarded that regime for declaring that opium growing is against the will of God. The war on drugs trumped the battle for democracy in Afghanistan.

About four months later, in August 2001, Massoud told an Indian film crew his fear that the US would face "a terrorism beyond comprehension." In that same month, Pakistan told the US that it wanted to stay out of bin Laden "issues." Massoud had long linked the Taliban with Pakistan, something that should be remembered today since they are once again moving with impunity back and forth across the Afghan-Pakistan border.

Massoud's dire predictions came true. The next month brought the assassination of Massoud and, two days later, the 9-11 attack on the US. It was later written in a piece by journalist Mike Boettcher that a declassified cable from the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency read: "Through Northern Alliance Northern intelligence efforts, the late commander Massoud gained limited knowledge regarding the intentions of the Saudi millionaire, Osama bin Laden and his terrorist organization, al-Qaida, to perform a terrorist act against the U.S., on a scale larger than the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania." Massoud is remembered now as an Afghan hero and a friend to the US. He should also be remembered as the voice in the wilderness whose warnings went unheeded.

After the 9-11 attack, President Bush was apparently still willing to allow the Taliban to remain in power. He sent them several messages stating that "time is running out" to surrender bin Laden and close al Qaeda's operations. The implication was that, had the Taliban handed over bin Laden and agreed to shut the terrorist training camps, they would have been allowed to remain in power. The Taliban resisted, demanding evidence that bin Laden was behind 9-11, and the US turned to Massoud's men in the Northern Alliance and began the proxy war which drove the Taliban underground and al Qaeda into Pakistan. Concurrently, and before the war in Afghanistan could succeed in its goals, a new war was begun.

After 9-11, the PNAC group who so urgently wanted the overthrow of Saddam back in 1998 saw their chance to voice their opinion once again. On September 20, 2001 they issued a statement which read in part, "...even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq." The rest, as they say, is history. The US found itself at war on two fronts, and the outcome of either is anybody's guess.

Memory is a curious thing. If memory served us better, perhaps we could avoid in the future the same mistakes made in the past. Massoud warned that the Taliban and al Qaeda were inextricably linked. Both are active once again in Afghanistan. The snake has two heads, and both heads must be crushed.
Massoud knew that in 2001. He would tell us to remember his warnings now.

The top Marine, General Conway, thinks it's time to send the Marines from Iraq to Afghanistan. It is obvious that NATO alone cannot secure the country and that the 25,000 US troops there are not enough. There is resistance to this suggestion within the ranks of the Bush administration who prefers to remain fixated on Iraq. What will it take to remind them that the real enemy lurks in Afghanistan and Pakistan and that they always have? How can their memories be jogged back to the summer of 2001 so that the warnings of Massoud are heard anew? The clock cannot be reset, but a now silenced voice from the past can still recall the future.

Was Bin Laden Right?

Many Americans don't know that there was a Part One to the 9-11 attack on this country, a part that took place in a different country two days prior and that was almost as long in the planning. Part One changed the face of the US invasion of Afghanistan before anyone even knew there would be a war in that country. Part One was a strategic move on the part of Osama bin Laden, and six years after the US invasion of Afghanistan, the brilliance of his dark strategy is even more apparent.  

 

In 2001, deep in the Hindu Kush Mountains of Afghanistan, lived legendary Afghan resistance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud. As a young man he fought and won against the Soviet Union. After the Communist government failed, he became the Defense Minister in the new government and, although the Rabbani government did not succeed, Massoud's dream of a free and democratic Afghanistan did not fail. When the Taliban and al Qaeda started to take over the country, many other mujahidin fled. Massoud stayed to fight again, insisting that if he could keep free only as much land as his hat could cover, he would never give up the fight.

 

It was apparent to Massoud that the Taliban and al Qaeda had become so entwined, separating them to rid Afghanistan of one but not the other was impossible, but for a long time, that was what the US wanted to do. Massoud was willing to help fight al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but he insisted that the Taliban be removed from power as well. He sent frequent warnings about the danger of this partnership, but they fell on deaf ears until it was too late.

 

Late in the summer of 2001, the CIA came around to Massoud's way of approaching the problem. He asked two things: resupply and re-arm the Northern Alliance, and apply pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban. Given this help, Massoud believed his troops could defeat the combined forces of the Taliban and al Qaeda and bring freedom and democracy to Afghanistan.

 

By this time, however, the 9-11 attack on the US was already set in motion. Bin Laden expected that the US would respond with a counterattack, and he concluded that it would be Massoud to whom the US would turn for help. By bin Laden's calculation, removing Massoud from the equation would slow down and impair the US response. Suicide bombers were dispatched to Massoud's camp, and the resistance leader was assassinated on 9-9-2001. Part One was completed. The final impediment to the 9-11 attack was removed. Part Two was about to happen.

 

After 9-11 occurred, it was, indeed, to Massoud's Northern Alliance to whom the US turned. Deals were made with the former Soviet countries to the north, and weapons started to pour into the hands of Massoud's troops. Working with US Special Ops and the CIA, the Northern Alliance went into battle. However, without the expertise of Massoud himself there to guide the  battles, direct his troops, and be the voice of experience on all things related to war in Afghanistan, the Taliban and al Qaeda were driven underground rather than being fully defeated.

 

That Massoud was essential for victory in Afghanistan is apparent today. The Taliban is making its resurgence. The central government is weak and largely ineffectual to help or protect the citizens of the country. The remaining northern warlords are rearming. Another civil war is not impossible to imagine. None of these things might be happening had Massoud survived. He had an extraordinary ability to bring people together, even those who were not usual allies. He was practical and pragmatic, but he also had a clear vision for a free, democratic Afghanistan, and he had a plan to implement it. After warring with the Taliban for a decade, he better than anyone knew the means necessary to defeat them and drive them back to Pakistan for good. Massoud was a once-in-a-lifetime leader, and no one in Afghanistan today has been able to take his place. 

 

Bin Laden was right when he surmised that eliminating Massoud would be an essential impairment to the US counter-attack after 9-11. He took away the one man who might actually have been able to bring peace and prosperity to Afghanistan.  

Terrorism in Afghanistan Looms Once Again

MaryAnn T. Beverly is an historian  and the author of FROM THAT FLAME, a novel that focuses on the life of freedom fighter Ahmed Shah Massoud and his twenty year, relentless struggle to bring peace and democracy to the Afghan people. Known as the Lion of Panjshir, Massoud was assassinated under orders from Osama bin Laden just two days before 19 terrorists flew airliners into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001.

As Beverly was researching for her book, she discovered a fascinating 30-year history between Afghanistan and the United States that began after the former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and continued through the mistakes and blunders made by the CIA and five U.S. presidents. In a recent radio interview, Beverly had this to say: "As we approach 2008, it is becoming increasingly apparent that Afghanistan is once again falling off the radar of US interest. Distracted by the war in Iraq, Afghanistan has become 'the forgotten war' with little manpower and fewer resources than necessary being devoted to its security and stability. Once again, both Al Qaeda and the Taliban are finding a safe-haven, and the people of both Afghanistan and the US will pay the price for ongoing neglect of that country."

While Osama bin Laden hides in the mountains between Pakistan and Afghanistan, insurgents are reorganizing and terrorizing Afghan leaders and parliamentarians. According to recent news reports, it is the insurgents' strategy to convince Afghans that their government and its Western backers are totally unable to bring security to their country, a country which has already suffered through nearly three decades of constant war.

Beverly went on to say, "It suited US foreign policy to finance and support the Afghan mujahidin in a proxy war when they were fighting the Soviet Union. It was easy to channel weapons through Pakistan to resistance leaders such as Ahmed Shah Massoud, and as long as the mujahidin were willing to fight, the US was willing to supply them. Once the Soviets withdrew in 1989, however, Afghanistan became little more than a blip on US radar, and the Afghan people were left to recover from their war without any real help. The lack of interest in the country and her people first destroyed the country and, second, provided a fertile breeding ground for Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

In 2001 after the 9-11 attack, the US once again fought a proxy war in Afghanistan. It relied heavily on the Northern Alliance to do the actual fighting. Sadly, this time around they had to fight without their leader because Massoud had been assassinated. Without his vision, wisdom, advice, and help, there was a vacuum no one yet has quite been able to fill. The US paid and armed various warlords and subcontracted much of the country's security to them, leaving US resources free be diverted to Iraq. Now these same warlords are reluctant to give up their weapons. They look with mistrust at their central government and doubt anyone's ability to bring the resurgent Taliban and Al Qaeda under control. The current turmoil is Pakistan is throwing fuel on the fire in both countries. Where a stable Afghanistan might have helped calm the situation, an unstable Afghanistan is contributing to the danger in the area."