From That Flame Book Trailer

The book trailer for From That Flame.

Ten Reasons People Should Know Massoud (in no particular order)

1. He was instrumental in the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan which lead to the breakup of the USSR
   
2. He was a visionary for a free and democratic Afghanistan
   
3. He was a long-time friend to the United States
   
4. He warned the West about the dangers posed by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda
   
5. He supported equal rights for women in Afghanistan
   
6. He was a moderate, tolerant, wise man who appreciated diversity
   
7. He sacrificed his entire life in the cause of freedom for his people
   
8. He was charismatic and intelligent
   
9. He was a once-in-a-century kind of man and leader
   
10. He was a true 'man for all seasons,' and no one in Afghanistan has risen to take his place

Distrust

"No one trusts anyone in Afghanistan," said Faheem Dasty, the young Afghan journalist who survived the suicide bombing that killed his leader and mentor Ahmed Shah Massoud in September 2001. It is an oft-repeated sentiment. There is growing evidence that Dasty's claim is true and that this lack of trust should be a vital concern to the United States. Ultimately, it may prove to be more dangerous than the Taliban or al Qaeda where the security of Afghanistan is concerned because it could result in another civil war.

 

When the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001, it relied heavily on Massoud's Northern Alliance to wage a proxy war. The Alliance, aka the United Front, had been held together largely by the strength and influence of Massoud. They were a collection of warlords with a common goal: to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Individually, each had his own agenda. Without Massoud as the linchpin, they were willing to work with the Americans even though not all of them shared his vision for a free and democratic Afghanistan. Nonetheless, at the behest of the US, this loose confederation of warriors banded together and fought their common enemy once again.

 

After the Taliban slipped into the shadows to regroup and bide its time, the United States turned again to these same warlords, this time to maintain security. Armed to the teeth and financed by the US, each warlord agreed to provide security for his own fiefdom. The idea of a strong central government in Kabulseemed to be a distant plan. The Loya Jirga commenced, Hamid Karzai was put in power, and little changed in the lands these warlords held. The one thing upon which they all still agreed was that the Taliban and al Qaeda should never attain power again. While keeping a wary eye on his supposed allies, each warlord increasingly focused his attention and power on his own slice of the country without concern about the country as a whole.

 

Realizing the potential threat the armed warlords offered, the UN started a disarmament effort that largely failed. Entrenched in their respective parts of the country with the drug and weapons trade growing, there was little motivation to disarm. There was also wide-spread disbelief that the central government and the Afghan National Army would be able to provide protection. With historic mistrust, the long-held prejudices and suspicions Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazar had for one another continued.

 

Recently, President Karzai reached out to “moderate” members of the Taliban in an effort at reconciliation. His actions raised alarms among the northern warlords. "It does strengthen the belief amongst the former Northern [Alliance] groups that they may have to be prepared to stand up to some kind of Pashtun-dominated government," said Christopher Langton, an expert from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. Some have suggested that the Northern warlords are merely using this as an excuse to arm themselves even more heavily, but in a country where trust is a commodity few can afford, their concerns might be understandable.

 

The Afghans worked with the US to expel the Soviets but found themselves in a civil war after factions of warlords fought for control of the new government. Tens of thousands of lives were lost, and the failed state became a breeding ground for terrorists. The same pattern pieces are falling into place again. The Afghans worked with the US to expel the Taliban and al Qaeda but once again find themselves teetering on a power struggle within the government. Extending his hand to moderate Taliban may be Karzai's effort to circumvent exactly that situation, but decades of war and betrayal make it difficult for everyone to trust his motives. Will the Northern warlords once again band together to fight the government in Kabul? They found a common ground when they fought the Soviets and the Taliban. Will they find one again in the Karzai government? These are the questions that must be answered before chaos returns and brings with it the potential for a failed state again. 

 

The irony of the situation cannot be overlooked. The US first asked the warlords to fight with them against the Taliban and al Qaeda, and then it armed them and asked them to protect their parts of the country. Now, those warlords are standing as a potential threat against the very same government the US put in power and supports.  “We are for you, and then we are against you,” they are told. It is a sentiment well known in Afghanistan. With growing distrust among Afghan warlords and government leaders, and with even more suspicion of the United States’ true motives, there can be no resolve."No one trusts anyone inAfghanistan."

Leaving Afghanistan Again . . .

When history repeats itself, there is hope that people have learned from their mistakes and that the past will not be prologue. Unfortunately, that is not the case with Afghanistan. The misjudgments and errors of the past are being repeated, and the consequences to both Afghanistan and the United States will be as tragic in the future as they were in the past.  

It suited US foreign policy to finance and support the Afghan mujahidin in a proxy war when they were fighting the Soviet Union. It was easy to channel weapons  through Pakistan to resistance leaders such as Ahmed Shah Massoud, and as long as the mujahidin were willing to fight, the US was willing to supply them. Once the Soviets withdrew in 1989, however, Afghanistan became little more than a blip on US radar, and the Afghan people were left to recover from their war without any real help. The lack of interest in the country and her people first destroyed the country and, second, provided a fertile breeding ground for Al Qaeda and the Taliban.  

In 2001 after the 9-11 attack, the US once again fought a proxy war in Afghanistan. It relied heavily on the Northern Alliance to do the actual fighting. Sadly, this time around they had to fight without their leader because Massoud had been assassinated. Without his vision, wisdom, advice, and help, there was a vacuum no one yet has quite been able to fill. The US paid and armed various warlords and subcontracted much of the country's security to them, leaving US resources free be diverted to Iraq. Now these same warlords are reluctant to give up their weapons. They look with mistrust at their central government and doubt anyone's ability to bring the resurgent Taliban and Al Qaeda under control. The current turmoil is Pakistan is throwing fuel on the fire in both countries. Where a stable Afghanistan might have helped calm the situation, an unstable Afghanistan is contributing to the danger in the area.

As we approach 2008, it is becoming increasingly apparent that Afghanistan is once again falling off the radar of US interest. Distracted by the war in Iraq, Afghanistan has become “the forgotten war” with little manpower and fewer resources than necessary being devoted to its security and stability. Once again both Al Qaeda and the Taliban are finding a safe-haven, and the people of both Afghanistan and the US will pay the price for ongoing neglect of that country.

If the US is not prepared to allow Afghanistan to fall once again into the hands of her enemies, attention must be paid and resources must be spent before it is too late. The Taliban and Al Qaeda are waiting in the wings. They are counting days until US interest wanes again. The Afghan people still view the Americans as friends. We cannot abandon them again. The forgotten war must be remembered, or the mistakes history has already shone us will begin to repeat.

Terrorism in Afghanistan Looms Once Again

MaryAnn T. Beverly is an historian  and the author of FROM THAT FLAME, a novel that focuses on the life of freedom fighter Ahmed Shah Massoud and his twenty year, relentless struggle to bring peace and democracy to the Afghan people. Known as the Lion of Panjshir, Massoud was assassinated under orders from Osama bin Laden just two days before 19 terrorists flew airliners into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001.

As Beverly was researching for her book, she discovered a fascinating 30-year history between Afghanistan and the United States that began after the former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and continued through the mistakes and blunders made by the CIA and five U.S. presidents. In a recent radio interview, Beverly had this to say: "As we approach 2008, it is becoming increasingly apparent that Afghanistan is once again falling off the radar of US interest. Distracted by the war in Iraq, Afghanistan has become 'the forgotten war' with little manpower and fewer resources than necessary being devoted to its security and stability. Once again, both Al Qaeda and the Taliban are finding a safe-haven, and the people of both Afghanistan and the US will pay the price for ongoing neglect of that country."

While Osama bin Laden hides in the mountains between Pakistan and Afghanistan, insurgents are reorganizing and terrorizing Afghan leaders and parliamentarians. According to recent news reports, it is the insurgents' strategy to convince Afghans that their government and its Western backers are totally unable to bring security to their country, a country which has already suffered through nearly three decades of constant war.

Beverly went on to say, "It suited US foreign policy to finance and support the Afghan mujahidin in a proxy war when they were fighting the Soviet Union. It was easy to channel weapons through Pakistan to resistance leaders such as Ahmed Shah Massoud, and as long as the mujahidin were willing to fight, the US was willing to supply them. Once the Soviets withdrew in 1989, however, Afghanistan became little more than a blip on US radar, and the Afghan people were left to recover from their war without any real help. The lack of interest in the country and her people first destroyed the country and, second, provided a fertile breeding ground for Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

In 2001 after the 9-11 attack, the US once again fought a proxy war in Afghanistan. It relied heavily on the Northern Alliance to do the actual fighting. Sadly, this time around they had to fight without their leader because Massoud had been assassinated. Without his vision, wisdom, advice, and help, there was a vacuum no one yet has quite been able to fill. The US paid and armed various warlords and subcontracted much of the country's security to them, leaving US resources free be diverted to Iraq. Now these same warlords are reluctant to give up their weapons. They look with mistrust at their central government and doubt anyone's ability to bring the resurgent Taliban and Al Qaeda under control. The current turmoil is Pakistan is throwing fuel on the fire in both countries. Where a stable Afghanistan might have helped calm the situation, an unstable Afghanistan is contributing to the danger in the area."