Ahmed Shah Massoud: A Biography

Ahmed Shah Massoud (pronouncedma - sood) (c. September 2, 1953 – September 9, 2001) was known as the "Lion of Panjshir". He was a man who prayed, hoped, dreamed, and fought for a free Afghanistan. He spent his entire adult life in service to his country and her people. Massoud was a man of peace forced into war. He was assassinated on September 9, 2001 by al-Qaeda suicide bombers who feared him more than any other man in the country.

Massoud was a fascinating dichotomy. This man who went to college to become an architect and create beautiful buildings ended up becoming so brilliant a military strategist that he is credited in large part for ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Nine times the Soviet Union tried to defeat Massoud in the Panjshir Valley, and nine times they were repelled.

Massoud's Early Years

How did Ahmed Shah Massoud become the Lion of Panjshir? Whatevents in his life caused this man to become one of the greatest military strategists and most charismatic leaders of the second half of the twentieth century?  Why was he considered so dangerous that Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network felt the need to assassinate Massoud two days before the attack on the World Trade Center?

Ahmed Shah Massoud was born in Jangalak in the Panjshir Valley in 1953. He attended the university in Kabul where he studied engineering. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979 changed the course of that country's history and the direction of Ahmed Shah Massoud's life. Gone were the days of prayer, study and youthful hope. Arrived were the days of resistence, war, and the mujahidin. (Literally meaning "strugglers," mujahidin is a term for Muslims fighting in a war or involved in any other struggle.) No one could have guessed in the early days that Massoud would become one of the most brilliant military strategists of his era.

When he joined the mujahidin around 1980, Ahmed Shah Massoud had no idea that the next twenty years - the rest of his life - would be involved in one war campaign after the other. When the Soviet Union finally left Afghanistan, factional fighting within the country lead to a civil war. The Taliban, financed and sponsored by Pakistan, went into Afghanistan with a promise of law and order. At first the war-weary citizens welcomed the Taliban and their promises of peace and control. It did not take long, however, for the enormity of the mistake to become known.

The Taliban inflicted on the people of Afghanistan a repressive version of extreme Islam. They denied the people all human rights, abolished music and song, closed schools and medical centers, and established the Ministry of Good and Evil to enforce their belief system on the entire country. Ahmed Shah Massoud and other mujahadinfound this radical form of Islam impossible to accept. They formed an alliance and swore to free their land from this latest invading force.

As time passed the Taliban, first supported by the Pakastani ISI, developed a close association with Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist organization. Well funded and with military support from those organizations, the Taliban took control of more and more areas of Afghanistan.

Commander Massoud suffered several setbacks. His appeals for help from the West fell on deaf ears. Although Massoud represented the UN-recognized government of Afghanistan, few countries without a vested interest in controlling Afghan soil did anything to help the mujahidin in their struggle. They were finally forced into the northeast corner of the country, the Panjshir Valley, and maintained control of between five to ten percent of the country. The United States and other countries who had armed and supplied their former allies in the war against the Soviet Union began to consider whether or not they should recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

On September 9, 2001 al-Qaeda suicide bombers assassinated Ahmed Shah Massoud. They had been posing as Moroccan documentary film makers. One man had a video camera filled with explosives. The other assassin tried to escape but was killed by Massoud's bodyguards. While the initial blast did not kill Massoud, he was severly injured in the head, chest, and legs.  Efforts were made to get him to a hospital in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, but he died en route.

Worried that the Taliban and al-Qaeda would believe the Northern Alliance was leaderless and therefore vulnerable to attack, word was sent around the world that Massoud had been injured but was expected to survive.

Two days later, on September 11, al-Qaeda attacked the United States with more suicide bombers. To many people the assassination of Massoud is directly linked to the attack upon America. One school of thought is that bin Laden wanted to further indebt the Taliban to him by killing the man they most feared. Others believe that Massoud posed a threat to al-Qaeda itself. He was a man around whom America's responsive attack would most easily be built. With the death of Massoud, the United States lost its most valuable and able Afghan ally.

Learn more about Massoud in From That Flame.
Order it now!

Afghanistan in danger of becoming a divided state...

Payvand Iran News Thu, 22 Nov 2007 8:29 AM PST
The Senlis Council on Wednesday called on NATO's troop force size to be doubled to 80,000 after its new security assessment report based on field research during the last month revealed 54% of Afghanistan's landmass now hosts a permanent Taliban presence.

Was Bin Laden Right?

Many Americans don't know that there was a Part One to the 9-11 attack on this country, a part that took place in a different country two days prior and that was almost as long in the planning. Part One changed the face of the US invasion of Afghanistan before anyone even knew there would be a war in that country. Part One was a strategic move on the part of Osama bin Laden, and six years after the US invasion of Afghanistan, the brilliance of his dark strategy is even more apparent.  

 

In 2001, deep in the Hindu Kush Mountains of Afghanistan, lived legendary Afghan resistance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud. As a young man he fought and won against the Soviet Union. After the Communist government failed, he became the Defense Minister in the new government and, although the Rabbani government did not succeed, Massoud's dream of a free and democratic Afghanistan did not fail. When the Taliban and al Qaeda started to take over the country, many other mujahidin fled. Massoud stayed to fight again, insisting that if he could keep free only as much land as his hat could cover, he would never give up the fight.

 

It was apparent to Massoud that the Taliban and al Qaeda had become so entwined, separating them to rid Afghanistan of one but not the other was impossible, but for a long time, that was what the US wanted to do. Massoud was willing to help fight al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but he insisted that the Taliban be removed from power as well. He sent frequent warnings about the danger of this partnership, but they fell on deaf ears until it was too late.

 

Late in the summer of 2001, the CIA came around to Massoud's way of approaching the problem. He asked two things: resupply and re-arm the Northern Alliance, and apply pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban. Given this help, Massoud believed his troops could defeat the combined forces of the Taliban and al Qaeda and bring freedom and democracy to Afghanistan.

 

By this time, however, the 9-11 attack on the US was already set in motion. Bin Laden expected that the US would respond with a counterattack, and he concluded that it would be Massoud to whom the US would turn for help. By bin Laden's calculation, removing Massoud from the equation would slow down and impair the US response. Suicide bombers were dispatched to Massoud's camp, and the resistance leader was assassinated on 9-9-2001. Part One was completed. The final impediment to the 9-11 attack was removed. Part Two was about to happen.

 

After 9-11 occurred, it was, indeed, to Massoud's Northern Alliance to whom the US turned. Deals were made with the former Soviet countries to the north, and weapons started to pour into the hands of Massoud's troops. Working with US Special Ops and the CIA, the Northern Alliance went into battle. However, without the expertise of Massoud himself there to guide the  battles, direct his troops, and be the voice of experience on all things related to war in Afghanistan, the Taliban and al Qaeda were driven underground rather than being fully defeated.

 

That Massoud was essential for victory in Afghanistan is apparent today. The Taliban is making its resurgence. The central government is weak and largely ineffectual to help or protect the citizens of the country. The remaining northern warlords are rearming. Another civil war is not impossible to imagine. None of these things might be happening had Massoud survived. He had an extraordinary ability to bring people together, even those who were not usual allies. He was practical and pragmatic, but he also had a clear vision for a free, democratic Afghanistan, and he had a plan to implement it. After warring with the Taliban for a decade, he better than anyone knew the means necessary to defeat them and drive them back to Pakistan for good. Massoud was a once-in-a-lifetime leader, and no one in Afghanistan today has been able to take his place. 

 

Bin Laden was right when he surmised that eliminating Massoud would be an essential impairment to the US counter-attack after 9-11. He took away the one man who might actually have been able to bring peace and prosperity to Afghanistan.  

News Story: Afghanistan is fifth last on a global index of human development

Sun Nov 18, 7:17 AM ET

KABUL (AFP) - Afghanistan is fifth last on a global index of human development, according to a report released Sunday, despite billions of dollars in aid and help since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001.

The country's ranking on the Human Development Index -- a composite survey of education, longevity and economic performance -- is the lowest outside Africa, according to the Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007.

The score was fractionally lower than that in the last such report, which was in 2004, but officials said this was more due to changes in data than a reflection of a real decline.

Accurate statistics are difficult to find in Afghanistan, where even the size of the population is not clear.

The report urged donors to fulfil aid commitments, adding that since 2006 they have contributed or pledged 10 billion dollars, "only half of what the government believes is needed to implement its development strategy."

Afghanistan's position of 174th out of 178 placed it above only Niger (the lowest), Sierra Leone, Mali and Burkina Faso, and it was second to last on a separate ranking reflecting inequalities between men and women.

The study had limited distribution in the United States in September but it was officially released Sunday in Kabul.

There had, however, been some progress, said the document drawn up by the Centre for Policy and Human Development at Kabul University, supported by the United Nations Development Programme.

Gross domestic product per person increased from 683 dollars in 2002 to 964 dollars in 2005, it said.

Another 132,000 square kilometres (52,800 square miles) of land was cleared of landmines in 2006 and the number of telephone users shot up to 2.5 million, or 10 percent of the population.

School enrolment has grown over the past five years from 900,000 to nearly 5.4 million, it said.

However, the report cautioned that about one-third of Afghans still do not have enough food to eat or access to safe drinking water, and only 12 percent of women are literate compared with 32 percent of men.

Infant mortality has dropped from 165 babies per 1,000 births to 135 but is still among the highest in the world, as is maternal mortality.

Life expectancy in 2005 was 43 years, down from 44.5 in 2003, it noted.

The report said development is being hit by the weak rule of law, including insurgent attacks that killed twice as many people in 2006 as in the previous year.

Other major concerns were "the abuse of political and military power, the misuse of public funds, the non-transparent privatisation of state-owned enterprises, kickbacks from the sale of narcotics, and other criminal activities."

The justice system was meanwhile struggling to cope, with underqualified judges, allegations of corruption and a backlog of some 6,000 cases awaiting adjudication.

The report proposed a "hybrid" system of justice to strengthen the rule of law with trusted traditional methods of dispute settlement, including through community meetings and tribal structures, complementing the judiciary.

From That Flame Book Trailer

The book trailer for From That Flame.

Ten Reasons People Should Know Massoud (in no particular order)

1. He was instrumental in the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan which lead to the breakup of the USSR
   
2. He was a visionary for a free and democratic Afghanistan
   
3. He was a long-time friend to the United States
   
4. He warned the West about the dangers posed by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda
   
5. He supported equal rights for women in Afghanistan
   
6. He was a moderate, tolerant, wise man who appreciated diversity
   
7. He sacrificed his entire life in the cause of freedom for his people
   
8. He was charismatic and intelligent
   
9. He was a once-in-a-century kind of man and leader
   
10. He was a true 'man for all seasons,' and no one in Afghanistan has risen to take his place

Distrust

"No one trusts anyone in Afghanistan," said Faheem Dasty, the young Afghan journalist who survived the suicide bombing that killed his leader and mentor Ahmed Shah Massoud in September 2001. It is an oft-repeated sentiment. There is growing evidence that Dasty's claim is true and that this lack of trust should be a vital concern to the United States. Ultimately, it may prove to be more dangerous than the Taliban or al Qaeda where the security of Afghanistan is concerned because it could result in another civil war.

 

When the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001, it relied heavily on Massoud's Northern Alliance to wage a proxy war. The Alliance, aka the United Front, had been held together largely by the strength and influence of Massoud. They were a collection of warlords with a common goal: to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Individually, each had his own agenda. Without Massoud as the linchpin, they were willing to work with the Americans even though not all of them shared his vision for a free and democratic Afghanistan. Nonetheless, at the behest of the US, this loose confederation of warriors banded together and fought their common enemy once again.

 

After the Taliban slipped into the shadows to regroup and bide its time, the United States turned again to these same warlords, this time to maintain security. Armed to the teeth and financed by the US, each warlord agreed to provide security for his own fiefdom. The idea of a strong central government in Kabulseemed to be a distant plan. The Loya Jirga commenced, Hamid Karzai was put in power, and little changed in the lands these warlords held. The one thing upon which they all still agreed was that the Taliban and al Qaeda should never attain power again. While keeping a wary eye on his supposed allies, each warlord increasingly focused his attention and power on his own slice of the country without concern about the country as a whole.

 

Realizing the potential threat the armed warlords offered, the UN started a disarmament effort that largely failed. Entrenched in their respective parts of the country with the drug and weapons trade growing, there was little motivation to disarm. There was also wide-spread disbelief that the central government and the Afghan National Army would be able to provide protection. With historic mistrust, the long-held prejudices and suspicions Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazar had for one another continued.

 

Recently, President Karzai reached out to “moderate” members of the Taliban in an effort at reconciliation. His actions raised alarms among the northern warlords. "It does strengthen the belief amongst the former Northern [Alliance] groups that they may have to be prepared to stand up to some kind of Pashtun-dominated government," said Christopher Langton, an expert from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. Some have suggested that the Northern warlords are merely using this as an excuse to arm themselves even more heavily, but in a country where trust is a commodity few can afford, their concerns might be understandable.

 

The Afghans worked with the US to expel the Soviets but found themselves in a civil war after factions of warlords fought for control of the new government. Tens of thousands of lives were lost, and the failed state became a breeding ground for terrorists. The same pattern pieces are falling into place again. The Afghans worked with the US to expel the Taliban and al Qaeda but once again find themselves teetering on a power struggle within the government. Extending his hand to moderate Taliban may be Karzai's effort to circumvent exactly that situation, but decades of war and betrayal make it difficult for everyone to trust his motives. Will the Northern warlords once again band together to fight the government in Kabul? They found a common ground when they fought the Soviets and the Taliban. Will they find one again in the Karzai government? These are the questions that must be answered before chaos returns and brings with it the potential for a failed state again. 

 

The irony of the situation cannot be overlooked. The US first asked the warlords to fight with them against the Taliban and al Qaeda, and then it armed them and asked them to protect their parts of the country. Now, those warlords are standing as a potential threat against the very same government the US put in power and supports.  “We are for you, and then we are against you,” they are told. It is a sentiment well known in Afghanistan. With growing distrust among Afghan warlords and government leaders, and with even more suspicion of the United States’ true motives, there can be no resolve."No one trusts anyone inAfghanistan."

Leaving Afghanistan Again . . .

When history repeats itself, there is hope that people have learned from their mistakes and that the past will not be prologue. Unfortunately, that is not the case with Afghanistan. The misjudgments and errors of the past are being repeated, and the consequences to both Afghanistan and the United States will be as tragic in the future as they were in the past.  

It suited US foreign policy to finance and support the Afghan mujahidin in a proxy war when they were fighting the Soviet Union. It was easy to channel weapons  through Pakistan to resistance leaders such as Ahmed Shah Massoud, and as long as the mujahidin were willing to fight, the US was willing to supply them. Once the Soviets withdrew in 1989, however, Afghanistan became little more than a blip on US radar, and the Afghan people were left to recover from their war without any real help. The lack of interest in the country and her people first destroyed the country and, second, provided a fertile breeding ground for Al Qaeda and the Taliban.  

In 2001 after the 9-11 attack, the US once again fought a proxy war in Afghanistan. It relied heavily on the Northern Alliance to do the actual fighting. Sadly, this time around they had to fight without their leader because Massoud had been assassinated. Without his vision, wisdom, advice, and help, there was a vacuum no one yet has quite been able to fill. The US paid and armed various warlords and subcontracted much of the country's security to them, leaving US resources free be diverted to Iraq. Now these same warlords are reluctant to give up their weapons. They look with mistrust at their central government and doubt anyone's ability to bring the resurgent Taliban and Al Qaeda under control. The current turmoil is Pakistan is throwing fuel on the fire in both countries. Where a stable Afghanistan might have helped calm the situation, an unstable Afghanistan is contributing to the danger in the area.

As we approach 2008, it is becoming increasingly apparent that Afghanistan is once again falling off the radar of US interest. Distracted by the war in Iraq, Afghanistan has become “the forgotten war” with little manpower and fewer resources than necessary being devoted to its security and stability. Once again both Al Qaeda and the Taliban are finding a safe-haven, and the people of both Afghanistan and the US will pay the price for ongoing neglect of that country.

If the US is not prepared to allow Afghanistan to fall once again into the hands of her enemies, attention must be paid and resources must be spent before it is too late. The Taliban and Al Qaeda are waiting in the wings. They are counting days until US interest wanes again. The Afghan people still view the Americans as friends. We cannot abandon them again. The forgotten war must be remembered, or the mistakes history has already shone us will begin to repeat.

Terrorism in Afghanistan Looms Once Again

MaryAnn T. Beverly is an historian  and the author of FROM THAT FLAME, a novel that focuses on the life of freedom fighter Ahmed Shah Massoud and his twenty year, relentless struggle to bring peace and democracy to the Afghan people. Known as the Lion of Panjshir, Massoud was assassinated under orders from Osama bin Laden just two days before 19 terrorists flew airliners into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001.

As Beverly was researching for her book, she discovered a fascinating 30-year history between Afghanistan and the United States that began after the former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and continued through the mistakes and blunders made by the CIA and five U.S. presidents. In a recent radio interview, Beverly had this to say: "As we approach 2008, it is becoming increasingly apparent that Afghanistan is once again falling off the radar of US interest. Distracted by the war in Iraq, Afghanistan has become 'the forgotten war' with little manpower and fewer resources than necessary being devoted to its security and stability. Once again, both Al Qaeda and the Taliban are finding a safe-haven, and the people of both Afghanistan and the US will pay the price for ongoing neglect of that country."

While Osama bin Laden hides in the mountains between Pakistan and Afghanistan, insurgents are reorganizing and terrorizing Afghan leaders and parliamentarians. According to recent news reports, it is the insurgents' strategy to convince Afghans that their government and its Western backers are totally unable to bring security to their country, a country which has already suffered through nearly three decades of constant war.

Beverly went on to say, "It suited US foreign policy to finance and support the Afghan mujahidin in a proxy war when they were fighting the Soviet Union. It was easy to channel weapons through Pakistan to resistance leaders such as Ahmed Shah Massoud, and as long as the mujahidin were willing to fight, the US was willing to supply them. Once the Soviets withdrew in 1989, however, Afghanistan became little more than a blip on US radar, and the Afghan people were left to recover from their war without any real help. The lack of interest in the country and her people first destroyed the country and, second, provided a fertile breeding ground for Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

In 2001 after the 9-11 attack, the US once again fought a proxy war in Afghanistan. It relied heavily on the Northern Alliance to do the actual fighting. Sadly, this time around they had to fight without their leader because Massoud had been assassinated. Without his vision, wisdom, advice, and help, there was a vacuum no one yet has quite been able to fill. The US paid and armed various warlords and subcontracted much of the country's security to them, leaving US resources free be diverted to Iraq. Now these same warlords are reluctant to give up their weapons. They look with mistrust at their central government and doubt anyone's ability to bring the resurgent Taliban and Al Qaeda under control. The current turmoil is Pakistan is throwing fuel on the fire in both countries. Where a stable Afghanistan might have helped calm the situation, an unstable Afghanistan is contributing to the danger in the area."