Do You Recall?

Memory is a curious thing. People tend to forget those things of which they are not reminded. Now that the US is embroiled in wars on two fronts, examining a timeline of US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq serves to refresh our memory of how we got to where we are. Here is a walk down memory lane.

In December 1997 members of the Taliban paid a visit to Texas to discuss with oil barons the possibility of building a pipeline through Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, VP Dick Cheney, then CEO of Halliburton, said "I can't think of a time when we've had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant.... It's almost as if the opportunities have arisen overnight." Coincidentally, Mr. Cheney was equally as interested in Iraq as Afghanistan, but for a different reason. The month after negotiating with the Taliban, in January 1998 Mr. Cheney signed his name to a document sponsored by The People for a New American Century. It read in part, "Saddam Hussein must go... [I]f the United States is committed... to insuring that the Iraqi leader never again uses weapons of mass destruction, the only way to achieve that goal is to remove Mr. Hussein and his regime from power. Any policy short of that will fail." The Taliban was worthy of being a business partner, but Saddam had to go.

This attitude carried over into the Bush administration in 2001. One of the first things President Bush did was fill his administration with members from that very same People for a New American Century who disliked Saddam but tolerated the Taliban. Those names include: Elliott Abrams, Dick Cheney, Frank Gaffney, Zalmay Khalilzad, Lewis Libby, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz. By February 2001, the newly inaugurated President Bush himself started saber-rattling against Saddam. "Our intention is to make sure that the world is as peaceful as possible and we're going to watch very carefully as to whether he (Saddam) develops weapons of mass destruction," Bush said. "If we catch him doing so, we're going to take appropriate action."

While all this attention was being focused on Saddam in early 2001, there was a man, an ally of the United States, who was trying with all his might to get the attention of Washington. His name was Ahmed Shah Massoud. On April 6, 2001, Massoud, the Defense Minister of the deposed but legitimate Afghan government and the man who lead the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda, addressed the European Union. He was asked if he had a message for President Bush. He replied, "My message to President Bush is the following: If he isn't interested in peace in Afghanistan, if he doesn't help the Afghan people to arrive at their objective of peace, the Americans and the rest of the world will have to face the problems.... If President Bush doesn't help us, these terrorists will damage the US and Europe very soon.."

Rather than heed Massoud's advice, the current administration decided a month later to give the Taliban a gift of $43 million. The gift, announced by then Secretary of State Colin Powell, in addition to other recent aid, made the U.S. the main sponsor of the Taliban and rewarded that regime for declaring that opium growing is against the will of God. The war on drugs trumped the battle for democracy in Afghanistan.

About four months later, in August 2001, Massoud told an Indian film crew his fear that the US would face "a terrorism beyond comprehension." In that same month, Pakistan told the US that it wanted to stay out of bin Laden "issues." Massoud had long linked the Taliban with Pakistan, something that should be remembered today since they are once again moving with impunity back and forth across the Afghan-Pakistan border.

Massoud's dire predictions came true. The next month brought the assassination of Massoud and, two days later, the 9-11 attack on the US. It was later written in a piece by journalist Mike Boettcher that a declassified cable from the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency read: "Through Northern Alliance Northern intelligence efforts, the late commander Massoud gained limited knowledge regarding the intentions of the Saudi millionaire, Osama bin Laden and his terrorist organization, al-Qaida, to perform a terrorist act against the U.S., on a scale larger than the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania." Massoud is remembered now as an Afghan hero and a friend to the US. He should also be remembered as the voice in the wilderness whose warnings went unheeded.

After the 9-11 attack, President Bush was apparently still willing to allow the Taliban to remain in power. He sent them several messages stating that "time is running out" to surrender bin Laden and close al Qaeda's operations. The implication was that, had the Taliban handed over bin Laden and agreed to shut the terrorist training camps, they would have been allowed to remain in power. The Taliban resisted, demanding evidence that bin Laden was behind 9-11, and the US turned to Massoud's men in the Northern Alliance and began the proxy war which drove the Taliban underground and al Qaeda into Pakistan. Concurrently, and before the war in Afghanistan could succeed in its goals, a new war was begun.

After 9-11, the PNAC group who so urgently wanted the overthrow of Saddam back in 1998 saw their chance to voice their opinion once again. On September 20, 2001 they issued a statement which read in part, "...even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq." The rest, as they say, is history. The US found itself at war on two fronts, and the outcome of either is anybody's guess.

Memory is a curious thing. If memory served us better, perhaps we could avoid in the future the same mistakes made in the past. Massoud warned that the Taliban and al Qaeda were inextricably linked. Both are active once again in Afghanistan. The snake has two heads, and both heads must be crushed.
Massoud knew that in 2001. He would tell us to remember his warnings now.

The top Marine, General Conway, thinks it's time to send the Marines from Iraq to Afghanistan. It is obvious that NATO alone cannot secure the country and that the 25,000 US troops there are not enough. There is resistance to this suggestion within the ranks of the Bush administration who prefers to remain fixated on Iraq. What will it take to remind them that the real enemy lurks in Afghanistan and Pakistan and that they always have? How can their memories be jogged back to the summer of 2001 so that the warnings of Massoud are heard anew? The clock cannot be reset, but a now silenced voice from the past can still recall the future.

Ahmed Shah Massoud: A Biography

Ahmed Shah Massoud (pronouncedma - sood) (c. September 2, 1953 – September 9, 2001) was known as the "Lion of Panjshir". He was a man who prayed, hoped, dreamed, and fought for a free Afghanistan. He spent his entire adult life in service to his country and her people. Massoud was a man of peace forced into war. He was assassinated on September 9, 2001 by al-Qaeda suicide bombers who feared him more than any other man in the country.

Massoud was a fascinating dichotomy. This man who went to college to become an architect and create beautiful buildings ended up becoming so brilliant a military strategist that he is credited in large part for ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Nine times the Soviet Union tried to defeat Massoud in the Panjshir Valley, and nine times they were repelled.

Massoud's Early Years

How did Ahmed Shah Massoud become the Lion of Panjshir? Whatevents in his life caused this man to become one of the greatest military strategists and most charismatic leaders of the second half of the twentieth century?  Why was he considered so dangerous that Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network felt the need to assassinate Massoud two days before the attack on the World Trade Center?

Ahmed Shah Massoud was born in Jangalak in the Panjshir Valley in 1953. He attended the university in Kabul where he studied engineering. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979 changed the course of that country's history and the direction of Ahmed Shah Massoud's life. Gone were the days of prayer, study and youthful hope. Arrived were the days of resistence, war, and the mujahidin. (Literally meaning "strugglers," mujahidin is a term for Muslims fighting in a war or involved in any other struggle.) No one could have guessed in the early days that Massoud would become one of the most brilliant military strategists of his era.

When he joined the mujahidin around 1980, Ahmed Shah Massoud had no idea that the next twenty years - the rest of his life - would be involved in one war campaign after the other. When the Soviet Union finally left Afghanistan, factional fighting within the country lead to a civil war. The Taliban, financed and sponsored by Pakistan, went into Afghanistan with a promise of law and order. At first the war-weary citizens welcomed the Taliban and their promises of peace and control. It did not take long, however, for the enormity of the mistake to become known.

The Taliban inflicted on the people of Afghanistan a repressive version of extreme Islam. They denied the people all human rights, abolished music and song, closed schools and medical centers, and established the Ministry of Good and Evil to enforce their belief system on the entire country. Ahmed Shah Massoud and other mujahadinfound this radical form of Islam impossible to accept. They formed an alliance and swore to free their land from this latest invading force.

As time passed the Taliban, first supported by the Pakastani ISI, developed a close association with Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist organization. Well funded and with military support from those organizations, the Taliban took control of more and more areas of Afghanistan.

Commander Massoud suffered several setbacks. His appeals for help from the West fell on deaf ears. Although Massoud represented the UN-recognized government of Afghanistan, few countries without a vested interest in controlling Afghan soil did anything to help the mujahidin in their struggle. They were finally forced into the northeast corner of the country, the Panjshir Valley, and maintained control of between five to ten percent of the country. The United States and other countries who had armed and supplied their former allies in the war against the Soviet Union began to consider whether or not they should recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

On September 9, 2001 al-Qaeda suicide bombers assassinated Ahmed Shah Massoud. They had been posing as Moroccan documentary film makers. One man had a video camera filled with explosives. The other assassin tried to escape but was killed by Massoud's bodyguards. While the initial blast did not kill Massoud, he was severly injured in the head, chest, and legs.  Efforts were made to get him to a hospital in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, but he died en route.

Worried that the Taliban and al-Qaeda would believe the Northern Alliance was leaderless and therefore vulnerable to attack, word was sent around the world that Massoud had been injured but was expected to survive.

Two days later, on September 11, al-Qaeda attacked the United States with more suicide bombers. To many people the assassination of Massoud is directly linked to the attack upon America. One school of thought is that bin Laden wanted to further indebt the Taliban to him by killing the man they most feared. Others believe that Massoud posed a threat to al-Qaeda itself. He was a man around whom America's responsive attack would most easily be built. With the death of Massoud, the United States lost its most valuable and able Afghan ally.

Learn more about Massoud in From That Flame.
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Afghanistan in danger of becoming a divided state...

Payvand Iran News Thu, 22 Nov 2007 8:29 AM PST
The Senlis Council on Wednesday called on NATO's troop force size to be doubled to 80,000 after its new security assessment report based on field research during the last month revealed 54% of Afghanistan's landmass now hosts a permanent Taliban presence.

Was Bin Laden Right?

Many Americans don't know that there was a Part One to the 9-11 attack on this country, a part that took place in a different country two days prior and that was almost as long in the planning. Part One changed the face of the US invasion of Afghanistan before anyone even knew there would be a war in that country. Part One was a strategic move on the part of Osama bin Laden, and six years after the US invasion of Afghanistan, the brilliance of his dark strategy is even more apparent.  

 

In 2001, deep in the Hindu Kush Mountains of Afghanistan, lived legendary Afghan resistance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud. As a young man he fought and won against the Soviet Union. After the Communist government failed, he became the Defense Minister in the new government and, although the Rabbani government did not succeed, Massoud's dream of a free and democratic Afghanistan did not fail. When the Taliban and al Qaeda started to take over the country, many other mujahidin fled. Massoud stayed to fight again, insisting that if he could keep free only as much land as his hat could cover, he would never give up the fight.

 

It was apparent to Massoud that the Taliban and al Qaeda had become so entwined, separating them to rid Afghanistan of one but not the other was impossible, but for a long time, that was what the US wanted to do. Massoud was willing to help fight al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but he insisted that the Taliban be removed from power as well. He sent frequent warnings about the danger of this partnership, but they fell on deaf ears until it was too late.

 

Late in the summer of 2001, the CIA came around to Massoud's way of approaching the problem. He asked two things: resupply and re-arm the Northern Alliance, and apply pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban. Given this help, Massoud believed his troops could defeat the combined forces of the Taliban and al Qaeda and bring freedom and democracy to Afghanistan.

 

By this time, however, the 9-11 attack on the US was already set in motion. Bin Laden expected that the US would respond with a counterattack, and he concluded that it would be Massoud to whom the US would turn for help. By bin Laden's calculation, removing Massoud from the equation would slow down and impair the US response. Suicide bombers were dispatched to Massoud's camp, and the resistance leader was assassinated on 9-9-2001. Part One was completed. The final impediment to the 9-11 attack was removed. Part Two was about to happen.

 

After 9-11 occurred, it was, indeed, to Massoud's Northern Alliance to whom the US turned. Deals were made with the former Soviet countries to the north, and weapons started to pour into the hands of Massoud's troops. Working with US Special Ops and the CIA, the Northern Alliance went into battle. However, without the expertise of Massoud himself there to guide the  battles, direct his troops, and be the voice of experience on all things related to war in Afghanistan, the Taliban and al Qaeda were driven underground rather than being fully defeated.

 

That Massoud was essential for victory in Afghanistan is apparent today. The Taliban is making its resurgence. The central government is weak and largely ineffectual to help or protect the citizens of the country. The remaining northern warlords are rearming. Another civil war is not impossible to imagine. None of these things might be happening had Massoud survived. He had an extraordinary ability to bring people together, even those who were not usual allies. He was practical and pragmatic, but he also had a clear vision for a free, democratic Afghanistan, and he had a plan to implement it. After warring with the Taliban for a decade, he better than anyone knew the means necessary to defeat them and drive them back to Pakistan for good. Massoud was a once-in-a-lifetime leader, and no one in Afghanistan today has been able to take his place. 

 

Bin Laden was right when he surmised that eliminating Massoud would be an essential impairment to the US counter-attack after 9-11. He took away the one man who might actually have been able to bring peace and prosperity to Afghanistan.  

Distrust

"No one trusts anyone in Afghanistan," said Faheem Dasty, the young Afghan journalist who survived the suicide bombing that killed his leader and mentor Ahmed Shah Massoud in September 2001. It is an oft-repeated sentiment. There is growing evidence that Dasty's claim is true and that this lack of trust should be a vital concern to the United States. Ultimately, it may prove to be more dangerous than the Taliban or al Qaeda where the security of Afghanistan is concerned because it could result in another civil war.

 

When the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001, it relied heavily on Massoud's Northern Alliance to wage a proxy war. The Alliance, aka the United Front, had been held together largely by the strength and influence of Massoud. They were a collection of warlords with a common goal: to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Individually, each had his own agenda. Without Massoud as the linchpin, they were willing to work with the Americans even though not all of them shared his vision for a free and democratic Afghanistan. Nonetheless, at the behest of the US, this loose confederation of warriors banded together and fought their common enemy once again.

 

After the Taliban slipped into the shadows to regroup and bide its time, the United States turned again to these same warlords, this time to maintain security. Armed to the teeth and financed by the US, each warlord agreed to provide security for his own fiefdom. The idea of a strong central government in Kabulseemed to be a distant plan. The Loya Jirga commenced, Hamid Karzai was put in power, and little changed in the lands these warlords held. The one thing upon which they all still agreed was that the Taliban and al Qaeda should never attain power again. While keeping a wary eye on his supposed allies, each warlord increasingly focused his attention and power on his own slice of the country without concern about the country as a whole.

 

Realizing the potential threat the armed warlords offered, the UN started a disarmament effort that largely failed. Entrenched in their respective parts of the country with the drug and weapons trade growing, there was little motivation to disarm. There was also wide-spread disbelief that the central government and the Afghan National Army would be able to provide protection. With historic mistrust, the long-held prejudices and suspicions Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazar had for one another continued.

 

Recently, President Karzai reached out to “moderate” members of the Taliban in an effort at reconciliation. His actions raised alarms among the northern warlords. "It does strengthen the belief amongst the former Northern [Alliance] groups that they may have to be prepared to stand up to some kind of Pashtun-dominated government," said Christopher Langton, an expert from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. Some have suggested that the Northern warlords are merely using this as an excuse to arm themselves even more heavily, but in a country where trust is a commodity few can afford, their concerns might be understandable.

 

The Afghans worked with the US to expel the Soviets but found themselves in a civil war after factions of warlords fought for control of the new government. Tens of thousands of lives were lost, and the failed state became a breeding ground for terrorists. The same pattern pieces are falling into place again. The Afghans worked with the US to expel the Taliban and al Qaeda but once again find themselves teetering on a power struggle within the government. Extending his hand to moderate Taliban may be Karzai's effort to circumvent exactly that situation, but decades of war and betrayal make it difficult for everyone to trust his motives. Will the Northern warlords once again band together to fight the government in Kabul? They found a common ground when they fought the Soviets and the Taliban. Will they find one again in the Karzai government? These are the questions that must be answered before chaos returns and brings with it the potential for a failed state again. 

 

The irony of the situation cannot be overlooked. The US first asked the warlords to fight with them against the Taliban and al Qaeda, and then it armed them and asked them to protect their parts of the country. Now, those warlords are standing as a potential threat against the very same government the US put in power and supports.  “We are for you, and then we are against you,” they are told. It is a sentiment well known in Afghanistan. With growing distrust among Afghan warlords and government leaders, and with even more suspicion of the United States’ true motives, there can be no resolve."No one trusts anyone inAfghanistan."

Leaving Afghanistan Again . . .

When history repeats itself, there is hope that people have learned from their mistakes and that the past will not be prologue. Unfortunately, that is not the case with Afghanistan. The misjudgments and errors of the past are being repeated, and the consequences to both Afghanistan and the United States will be as tragic in the future as they were in the past.  

It suited US foreign policy to finance and support the Afghan mujahidin in a proxy war when they were fighting the Soviet Union. It was easy to channel weapons  through Pakistan to resistance leaders such as Ahmed Shah Massoud, and as long as the mujahidin were willing to fight, the US was willing to supply them. Once the Soviets withdrew in 1989, however, Afghanistan became little more than a blip on US radar, and the Afghan people were left to recover from their war without any real help. The lack of interest in the country and her people first destroyed the country and, second, provided a fertile breeding ground for Al Qaeda and the Taliban.  

In 2001 after the 9-11 attack, the US once again fought a proxy war in Afghanistan. It relied heavily on the Northern Alliance to do the actual fighting. Sadly, this time around they had to fight without their leader because Massoud had been assassinated. Without his vision, wisdom, advice, and help, there was a vacuum no one yet has quite been able to fill. The US paid and armed various warlords and subcontracted much of the country's security to them, leaving US resources free be diverted to Iraq. Now these same warlords are reluctant to give up their weapons. They look with mistrust at their central government and doubt anyone's ability to bring the resurgent Taliban and Al Qaeda under control. The current turmoil is Pakistan is throwing fuel on the fire in both countries. Where a stable Afghanistan might have helped calm the situation, an unstable Afghanistan is contributing to the danger in the area.

As we approach 2008, it is becoming increasingly apparent that Afghanistan is once again falling off the radar of US interest. Distracted by the war in Iraq, Afghanistan has become “the forgotten war” with little manpower and fewer resources than necessary being devoted to its security and stability. Once again both Al Qaeda and the Taliban are finding a safe-haven, and the people of both Afghanistan and the US will pay the price for ongoing neglect of that country.

If the US is not prepared to allow Afghanistan to fall once again into the hands of her enemies, attention must be paid and resources must be spent before it is too late. The Taliban and Al Qaeda are waiting in the wings. They are counting days until US interest wanes again. The Afghan people still view the Americans as friends. We cannot abandon them again. The forgotten war must be remembered, or the mistakes history has already shone us will begin to repeat.