Monday, November 19, 2007

Was Bin Laden Right?

Many Americans don't know that there was a Part One to the 9-11 attack on this country, a part that took place in a different country two days prior and that was almost as long in the planning. Part One changed the face of the US invasion of Afghanistan before anyone even knew there would be a war in that country. Part One was a strategic move on the part of Osama bin Laden, and six years after the US invasion of Afghanistan, the brilliance of his dark strategy is even more apparent.  
 
In 2001, deep in the Hindu Kush Mountains of Afghanistan, lived legendary Afghan resistance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud. As a young man he fought and won against the Soviet Union. After the Communist government failed, he became the Defense Minister in the new government and, although the Rabbani government did not succeed, Massoud's dream of a free and democratic Afghanistan did not fail. When the Taliban and al Qaeda started to take over the country, many other mujahidin fled. Massoud stayed to fight again, insisting that if he could keep free only as much land as his hat could cover, he would never give up the fight.
 
It was apparent to Massoud that the Taliban and al Qaeda had become so entwined, separating them to rid Afghanistan of one but not the other was impossible, but for a long time, that was what the US wanted to do. Massoud was willing to help fight al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but he insisted that the Taliban be removed from power as well. He sent frequent warnings about the danger of this partnership, but they fell on deaf ears until it was too late.
 
Late in the summer of 2001, the CIA came around to Massoud's way of approaching the problem. He asked two things: resupply and re-arm the Northern Alliance, and apply pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban. Given this help, Massoud believed his troops could defeat the combined forces of the Taliban and al Qaeda and bring freedom and democracy to Afghanistan.
 
By this time, however, the 9-11 attack on the US was already set in motion. Bin Laden expected that the US would respond with a counterattack, and he concluded that it would be Massoud to whom the US would turn for help. By bin Laden's calculation, removing Massoud from the equation would slow down and impair the US response. Suicide bombers were dispatched to Massoud's camp, and the resistance leader was assassinated on 9-9-2001. Part One was completed. The final impediment to the 9-11 attack was removed. Part Two was about to happen.
 
After 9-11 occurred, it was, indeed, to Massoud's Northern Alliance to whom the US turned. Deals were made with the former Soviet countries to the north, and weapons started to pour into the hands of Massoud's troops. Working with US Special Ops and the CIA, the Northern Alliance went into battle. However, without the expertise of Massoud himself there to guide the  battles, direct his troops, and be the voice of experience on all things related to war in Afghanistan, the Taliban and al Qaeda were driven underground rather than being fully defeated.
 
That Massoud was essential for victory in Afghanistan is apparent today. The Taliban is making its resurgence. The central government is weak and largely ineffectual to help or protect the citizens of the country. The remaining northern warlords are rearming. Another civil war is not impossible to imagine. None of these things might be happening had Massoud survived. He had an extraordinary ability to bring people together, even those who were not usual allies. He was practical and pragmatic, but he also had a clear vision for a free, democratic Afghanistan, and he had a plan to implement it. After warring with the Taliban for a decade, he better than anyone knew the means necessary to defeat them and drive them back to Pakistan for good. Massoud was a once-in-a-lifetime leader, and no one in Afghanistan today has been able to take his place. 
 
Bin Laden was right when he surmised that eliminating Massoud would be an essential impairment to the US counter-attack after 9-11. He took away the one man who might actually have been able to bring peace and prosperity to Afghanistan.  

No comments: