Was Bin Laden Right?

Many Americans don't know that there was a Part One to the 9-11 attack on this country, a part that took place in a different country two days prior and that was almost as long in the planning. Part One changed the face of the US invasion of Afghanistan before anyone even knew there would be a war in that country. Part One was a strategic move on the part of Osama bin Laden, and six years after the US invasion of Afghanistan, the brilliance of his dark strategy is even more apparent.  

 

In 2001, deep in the Hindu Kush Mountains of Afghanistan, lived legendary Afghan resistance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud. As a young man he fought and won against the Soviet Union. After the Communist government failed, he became the Defense Minister in the new government and, although the Rabbani government did not succeed, Massoud's dream of a free and democratic Afghanistan did not fail. When the Taliban and al Qaeda started to take over the country, many other mujahidin fled. Massoud stayed to fight again, insisting that if he could keep free only as much land as his hat could cover, he would never give up the fight.

 

It was apparent to Massoud that the Taliban and al Qaeda had become so entwined, separating them to rid Afghanistan of one but not the other was impossible, but for a long time, that was what the US wanted to do. Massoud was willing to help fight al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but he insisted that the Taliban be removed from power as well. He sent frequent warnings about the danger of this partnership, but they fell on deaf ears until it was too late.

 

Late in the summer of 2001, the CIA came around to Massoud's way of approaching the problem. He asked two things: resupply and re-arm the Northern Alliance, and apply pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban. Given this help, Massoud believed his troops could defeat the combined forces of the Taliban and al Qaeda and bring freedom and democracy to Afghanistan.

 

By this time, however, the 9-11 attack on the US was already set in motion. Bin Laden expected that the US would respond with a counterattack, and he concluded that it would be Massoud to whom the US would turn for help. By bin Laden's calculation, removing Massoud from the equation would slow down and impair the US response. Suicide bombers were dispatched to Massoud's camp, and the resistance leader was assassinated on 9-9-2001. Part One was completed. The final impediment to the 9-11 attack was removed. Part Two was about to happen.

 

After 9-11 occurred, it was, indeed, to Massoud's Northern Alliance to whom the US turned. Deals were made with the former Soviet countries to the north, and weapons started to pour into the hands of Massoud's troops. Working with US Special Ops and the CIA, the Northern Alliance went into battle. However, without the expertise of Massoud himself there to guide the  battles, direct his troops, and be the voice of experience on all things related to war in Afghanistan, the Taliban and al Qaeda were driven underground rather than being fully defeated.

 

That Massoud was essential for victory in Afghanistan is apparent today. The Taliban is making its resurgence. The central government is weak and largely ineffectual to help or protect the citizens of the country. The remaining northern warlords are rearming. Another civil war is not impossible to imagine. None of these things might be happening had Massoud survived. He had an extraordinary ability to bring people together, even those who were not usual allies. He was practical and pragmatic, but he also had a clear vision for a free, democratic Afghanistan, and he had a plan to implement it. After warring with the Taliban for a decade, he better than anyone knew the means necessary to defeat them and drive them back to Pakistan for good. Massoud was a once-in-a-lifetime leader, and no one in Afghanistan today has been able to take his place. 

 

Bin Laden was right when he surmised that eliminating Massoud would be an essential impairment to the US counter-attack after 9-11. He took away the one man who might actually have been able to bring peace and prosperity to Afghanistan.  

Ten Reasons People Should Know Massoud (in no particular order)

1. He was instrumental in the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan which lead to the breakup of the USSR
   
2. He was a visionary for a free and democratic Afghanistan
   
3. He was a long-time friend to the United States
   
4. He warned the West about the dangers posed by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda
   
5. He supported equal rights for women in Afghanistan
   
6. He was a moderate, tolerant, wise man who appreciated diversity
   
7. He sacrificed his entire life in the cause of freedom for his people
   
8. He was charismatic and intelligent
   
9. He was a once-in-a-century kind of man and leader
   
10. He was a true 'man for all seasons,' and no one in Afghanistan has risen to take his place

Distrust

"No one trusts anyone in Afghanistan," said Faheem Dasty, the young Afghan journalist who survived the suicide bombing that killed his leader and mentor Ahmed Shah Massoud in September 2001. It is an oft-repeated sentiment. There is growing evidence that Dasty's claim is true and that this lack of trust should be a vital concern to the United States. Ultimately, it may prove to be more dangerous than the Taliban or al Qaeda where the security of Afghanistan is concerned because it could result in another civil war.

 

When the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001, it relied heavily on Massoud's Northern Alliance to wage a proxy war. The Alliance, aka the United Front, had been held together largely by the strength and influence of Massoud. They were a collection of warlords with a common goal: to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Individually, each had his own agenda. Without Massoud as the linchpin, they were willing to work with the Americans even though not all of them shared his vision for a free and democratic Afghanistan. Nonetheless, at the behest of the US, this loose confederation of warriors banded together and fought their common enemy once again.

 

After the Taliban slipped into the shadows to regroup and bide its time, the United States turned again to these same warlords, this time to maintain security. Armed to the teeth and financed by the US, each warlord agreed to provide security for his own fiefdom. The idea of a strong central government in Kabulseemed to be a distant plan. The Loya Jirga commenced, Hamid Karzai was put in power, and little changed in the lands these warlords held. The one thing upon which they all still agreed was that the Taliban and al Qaeda should never attain power again. While keeping a wary eye on his supposed allies, each warlord increasingly focused his attention and power on his own slice of the country without concern about the country as a whole.

 

Realizing the potential threat the armed warlords offered, the UN started a disarmament effort that largely failed. Entrenched in their respective parts of the country with the drug and weapons trade growing, there was little motivation to disarm. There was also wide-spread disbelief that the central government and the Afghan National Army would be able to provide protection. With historic mistrust, the long-held prejudices and suspicions Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazar had for one another continued.

 

Recently, President Karzai reached out to “moderate” members of the Taliban in an effort at reconciliation. His actions raised alarms among the northern warlords. "It does strengthen the belief amongst the former Northern [Alliance] groups that they may have to be prepared to stand up to some kind of Pashtun-dominated government," said Christopher Langton, an expert from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. Some have suggested that the Northern warlords are merely using this as an excuse to arm themselves even more heavily, but in a country where trust is a commodity few can afford, their concerns might be understandable.

 

The Afghans worked with the US to expel the Soviets but found themselves in a civil war after factions of warlords fought for control of the new government. Tens of thousands of lives were lost, and the failed state became a breeding ground for terrorists. The same pattern pieces are falling into place again. The Afghans worked with the US to expel the Taliban and al Qaeda but once again find themselves teetering on a power struggle within the government. Extending his hand to moderate Taliban may be Karzai's effort to circumvent exactly that situation, but decades of war and betrayal make it difficult for everyone to trust his motives. Will the Northern warlords once again band together to fight the government in Kabul? They found a common ground when they fought the Soviets and the Taliban. Will they find one again in the Karzai government? These are the questions that must be answered before chaos returns and brings with it the potential for a failed state again. 

 

The irony of the situation cannot be overlooked. The US first asked the warlords to fight with them against the Taliban and al Qaeda, and then it armed them and asked them to protect their parts of the country. Now, those warlords are standing as a potential threat against the very same government the US put in power and supports.  “We are for you, and then we are against you,” they are told. It is a sentiment well known in Afghanistan. With growing distrust among Afghan warlords and government leaders, and with even more suspicion of the United States’ true motives, there can be no resolve."No one trusts anyone inAfghanistan."